From Anfield to the international break, the pattern is the same
De Zerbi's Spurs and the third man run
For three matches running, Tottenham under Roberto De Zerbi have done something they did not do under the previous manager. They have built attacks through a third man run rather than through a bouncing solo carry. The change is small, the consequences are large, and the October calendar finally gave us enough data to talk about it without guessing.
What a third man run actually is
Coaches use the phrase loosely, so let me pin it down. A third man run is the action that solves a two versus two. Player A passes to B. B does not receive to turn, B receives with the next pass already in his head, and that next pass goes to C, who has moved before B even touched the ball. C is the third man. A and B are the combination, C is the answer.
This is not the same as a one-two. A one-two is a give and go, usually off a wall, usually with the original passer the target. A third man run requires the passer to keep moving and a third attacker to time a diagonal or underlap into the space the combination opens. When it works, the defending midfield pair has to choose between stepping to the ball or tracking the runner. When it works repeatedly, the defending pair stops stepping to the ball, and the whole pressing structure behind them has to drop five yards.
This is what BBC Sport has been describing in different words all month when they talk about Spurs looking more like a possession team. It is also what UEFA's technical reports on Roberto De Zerbi's Brighton kept flagging in 2022 and 2023: not the press, the connection between press and progression.
Why October was the first time we could say it out loud
De Zerbi took the job in the summer. The first six weeks were spent installing the press, the rest defence behind the press, and the half-space rotations that his teams are known for. None of that is visible in the third man run on its own. You need a settled front four, a settled double pivot, and a settled full back pairing before the run actually lands.
By the second week of October all three of those had stabilised. The Liverpool match at Anfield on 4 October was the first time the front four started together: Richarlison through the middle, Mohammed Kudus and a rotating left sided player wide, with Dejan Kulusevski in the half space. The home draw with Aston Villa on 12 October was the second. The 3-1 win at home to a mid-table side on 18 October was the third.
Three matches is the minimum a serious coaching staff would call evidence. Earlier I would not have written this. I am writing it now because across those three matches the third man run produced four chances from open play where the assist came from the runner, not the passer, and in two of those four the runner was the central midfielder, not a winger. That second point matters and I will come back to it.
The Anfield example, slowed down
Liverpool 1 Tottenham 1, 4 October 2026. The clearest example came in the 38th minute. Pape Matar Sarr received between the lines, played a one touch pass inside to Rodrigo Bentancur, and continued his run forward and to the right. Bentancur did not turn. He shaped to play back to the centre back, and instead slipped a pass into the corridor Sarr had just opened. Sarr arrived on the half turn, 22 yards from goal, and forced a save from Alisson.
That is the whole idea in eight seconds. Sarr was the first man. Bentancur was the second. The right back, Pedro Porro, was the third, but he was not the one who received. The third man is not always the receiver. Sometimes the third man is the decoy that drags the marker away. In this case the runner who received was the original passer. That is fine, and it is what FIFA's performance analysis documents often call a third man combination where the roles rotate.
Under the previous Spurs manager this exact sequence would have ended with Bentancur turning, looking up, and playing a safe pass sideways. The pivot is small. The downstream effect is everything.
Why the central midfielder as runner is the real story
Most third man run work in the Premier League is done by wide players. A full back overlaps a winger, a winger underlaps a striker, a striker checks off a winger's shoulder. That is the easy version. The hard version, and the version De Zerbi coached at Sassuolo and Brighton, is the central midfielder as the runner.
When the number eight is the third man, the defending midfield pair has to mark him, which means one of the two centre backs has to step out to cover. That centre back stepping out is what opens the half space for the winger. The whole attack then flows through the corridor between centre back and full back, which is the corridor opposition sides are least used to defending.
This is what the academic literature on third man combinations has shown across the last decade: the runner's starting position changes the geometry of the press more than the runner's speed. A central midfielder as the runner pulls the deepest midfielder out of his lane. A winger as the runner does not.
In October, Spurs' number eights combined for seven third man runs that ended in a shot or a chance creating action. In the four matches before the international break, that number was two. Something changed, and I think what changed is that Bentancur stopped asking for the safe pass and started asking for the vertical one.
What this means for a coach watching on a Tuesday night
If you coach at any level below the Premier League, the lesson is not to copy De Zerbi. The lesson is to design one third man combination and rehearse it until your players stop thinking. Pick a half space, pick a trigger, pick a runner. Rehearse the combination against a passive block first. Then rehearse it against a press. Then rehearse it under fatigue.
For grassroots and academy coaches, the simplest version is this: a centre back plays to a central midfielder, the central midfielder lays it off to a dropping six, and the eight makes a third man run past the six into the space behind. It is one combination. It produces one runner. The runner either receives or drags a centre back out of position. Either way, the attack improves.
What De Zerbi has done at Spurs is take that same simple idea and layer three or four of them across the front line. The reason it works now and not in August is that his players have stopped making decisions and started recognising situations. That is the only thing that has changed. The pattern is the same pattern he ran at Sassuolo in 2018.
Caveats and what October did not tell us
Three matches is still a small sample. The opposition press structures varied. The Liverpool match was a deep block for long spells. The Villa match was end to end. The third match, against a side sitting 14th, was a low block for 70 minutes. The third man run is more useful against a low block than against a high press, so the sample skews favourable.
Also, De Zerbi has not yet had to face a side that defends the half space with a dedicated man, as Arsenal and Bayern have done in recent seasons. When that opponent arrives, the third man run will need a fourth man added. We have not seen that layer yet.
What I will say is this: the Spurs of October 2026 finally look like a team that knows what to do with the ball after winning it. That is a new sentence for this club in this calendar year, and it is the sentence worth writing down.